It is common sense that emotions play a central role in our lives. They are--arguably essentially--wrapped up in our relationships, our well-being, and in our personal and professional projects. Historically, the role of emotions in our mental life were much discussed by philosophers. For some time, the analytic turn in much of English-speaking philosophy at the turn of the 20th century changed this, and emotions largely fell by the wayside. In the last 20 years or so, analytic philosophers have once again began looking closely at emotions and their role in philosophy of mind, rationality, and ethical and metaethical theory. In this course, we will survey some of the answers to three central questions that have arisen in the recent literature on the philosophy of emotion:
What kind of mental states are emotions?
Do emotional states have representational content? If so, what is it?
What is the role of emotion in epistemology and rationality?
What kind of mental states are emotions?
Do emotional states have representational content? If so, what is it?
What is the role of emotion in epistemology and rationality?
- Teacher: Preston Werner